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Zarate, Juan. Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a
New Era of Financial Warfare. New York: PublicAffairs, 2013. 512pp. $30

A student once asked, “Why can’t Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan
just shut down the Iranian economy?” A
discussion about the limited effectiveness of trade sanctions followed, but the
student was more right than he or his
instructor realized. New tools of financial warfare wielded by the U.S. Treasury
and Justice Departments have been
powerful against terrorists, criminals,
and rogue states, at little economic or
diplomatic cost. This is the case made
by Juan Zarate in his latest publication.
Zarate led such efforts as the Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorist
Financing and Financial Crimes during
the George W. Bush administration.
Thereafter he served on the president’s
National Security Council staff.
The conventional wisdom is that trade
sanctions generally fail to make hostile
regimes change course, because they
rarely have enough multilateral support, are easy to evade, and are too
blunt in the pain they inflict on target
countries. Sanctions are even less useful against nonstate actors; there are
no Al Qaeda products to boycott.
Financial weapons capitalize on three
key differences. First, the global banking
system is a choke point. Even clandestine groups need financial services; Al
Qaeda may not have exports, but it does
have bank accounts. Second, U.S. power
is greater financially than economically. The United States represents only
one-fifth of the world economy, but the
dollar is the dominant reserve currency,
and most international trade is settled in
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dollars. Also, the United States has the
largest financial markets, and the other
big markets belong to like-minded allies. Foreign banks cannot risk access to
U.S. markets and clearinghouse banks.
Finally, access to the U.S. financial
sector is under unilateral American
control—U.S. regulators can bar American banks from doing business with
firms involved in money laundering,
drug trafficking, or terrorist support.
Zarate explains how U.S. agencies developed tools and techniques (a financial
intelligence infrastructure) to trace the
flow of money to and within groups of
interest, whether the Sinaloa cartel or
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Often
the mere threat of public disclosure, let
alone formal blacklisting, has convinced
foreign banks to cease business with
illicit groups, even banks in nations not
friendly to the United States. Zarate
details campaigns against targets like
Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, North Korea, and
Iran. He contends that financial tools
severely disrupted the terrorist groups
and pressured North Korea and Iran
into negotiations. However, causality
is far from proved (how effective were
financial sanctions versus Iran’s growing diplomatic isolation?), but the case
is plausible enough to take seriously.
There are limits to financial tools, and
the United States could undermine
its own advantages. To Zarate’s credit,
he shows sensitivity to such concerns.
Financial methods are powerful against
small targets considered illegal almost
everywhere (no rational bank would give
up Wall Street for Al Qaeda’s checking
account). North Korea and Iran can be
pressured, but Zarate doubts—correctly,
I think—that these regimes will give up
their nuclear trump cards to escape
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such pressure. Great powers are another
matter, since the financial relationships
are more symmetrical. One need only
consider the United Kingdom’s reluctance to limit lucrative financial ties to
Russia in the wake of the Crimea crisis.
Dominant as America is financially,
abuse of that power threatens the dollar’s
special role in global commerce. Zarate
relates an anecdote about an event that
took place in 2003, in which American
officials proposed cyber attacks against
Iraqi assets to penetrate bank computers
around the world covertly and set Iraqi
account balances to “zero.” Treasury
successfully argued that the plan would
shatter confidence and outrage allies, but
the proposal shows that not all leaders
see financial weapons in a nuanced light.
Nations have been slower than “realists” predicted to challenge the U.S.-led
financial order, likely because the system
has not harmed their interests. Freezing out terrorists is one thing, but if the
world perceives the United States as using access to global finance as a reward
for good behavior, the use of other
currencies and development of alternative payment systems will leap ahead.
Zarate writes as a participant and
advocate for the policy of financial
statecraft and for the institution of the
Treasury Department. One should not
treat Zarate’s account as definitive history (diplomats will likely disagree with
Zarate’s harsh take on the State Department), but it is a good, detailed account
of how policy is made and implemented.
The book could be better organized.
It is not quite chronological, not quite
thematic, and sometimes redundant.
The military will wish Zarate had
said more about Treasury and Defense Department cooperation.
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Treasury’s War is a useful contribution, though clearly a participant’s
account and not a scholarly assessment. It will interest those trying to
understand how economic tools can
support national security goals.
DAVID BURBACH

Naval War College

Wilson, James Graham. The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability, Reagan’s Engagement, and the End of the Cold War. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell Univ. Press, 2014. 264pp. $29.95

This is an interesting and innovative
look at the course of the Cold War. It is
interesting in large part because Wilson’s
perspective is to look for the unscripted
moments in the course of the conflict—
the occasions when grand strategy, even
policy, did not dictate outcomes. To a
political scientist, this is a refreshing approach. Political scientists and historians
often focus too heavily on patterns, theories, and grand schemes. This volume
is a reminder of the crucial role played
by policy makers struggling to make
up their minds at critical junctures.
Wilson’s book is well informed, looking for moments when leaders took
the initiative, such as when President
Reagan sensed a crisis in Poland in
1981. This work struck this nonspecialist as well documented and particularly well researched on the American
side. One might expect that of Wilson,
who served as a historian for the U.S.
State Department. Deliberations over
nuclear-arms limitations talks receive a
great deal of Wilson’s attention, as one
might expect, and his discussion of the
development of the Strategic Defense
Initiative is particularly engaging.
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